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Election	Roundup	

As Guatemala's election campaign heads toward the vote on 3 November, the major presidential candidates are avoiding the issues in favor of more personalistic politics. Although the campaign has been conducted amid seriously declining economic prospects, none of the candidates have argued forcefully for reform and austerity measures that we believe are required to forestall further economic deterioration. Fourteen parties-representing a broad political spectrum-are participating, but numerous sources indicate that Vinicio Cerezo Arevalo of the center-leftist Christian Democratic Party (DCG) and Jorge Carpio Nicolle of the National Centrist Union (UCN)—both pro-US moderates—are the frontrunners. Neither, however, is likely to win a majority on the first ballot, necessitating a runoff between the two top votegetters on 8 December, Although prohibited under the electoral law from forming official coalitions after the first round, (sp) there already are signs of behind-the-scenes maneuvering to build nonofficial alliances in anticipation of the second round.

Key Parties and Candidates The Christian Democratic Party. the DCG—representing the center-lett-

is run by a well-seasoned leadership that has attempted to portray its candidate as the only one capable of attracting foreign investment and reversing Guatemala's international isolation. Running on a slogan of "credibility and confidence," the party's support comes from mainstream lower middle class, campesinos, labor groups, youth and other reformist elements, including the Catholic Church. Cerezo's strategy appears predicated on the belief that he is unlikely to win a majority on the first ballot, and his advisers already

have begun planning for a runoff.

party leaders currently believe that Cerezo

would have a better chance of defeating Carpio of the centrist UCN than he would the center-left Democratic Party of National Cooperation/Revolutionary Party (PDCN/PR) coalition ticket headed by Jorge Serrano Elias.

Throughout the campaign, Cerezo has quietly courted the military by giving assurances that he does not plan to follow the example of President Alfonsin in Argentina and punish military officers for past abuses. Moreover,

he has tried to reassure the armed forces that he will not attempt to open a dialogue with leftist insurgents as has President Duarte, his Christian Democratic counterpart in El Salvador. In an effort to deflect criticism from Serrano and others that he is too closely associated with the military, Cerezo has taken a strong public stance against military interference in civilian government.

Cerezo's economic platform has relied heavily on his pledge to find postelection external financial support to reverse the country's economic slide. Although he assiduously has avoided outlining a comprehensive economic program,

economic team to study possible austerity measures and is considering a 90-day state of economic emergency upon taking office. If elected, we expect he would focus on increasing government revenues by reforming tax collection procedures. Moreover, his public statements to date indicate he also would be likely to concentrate on integrating Guatemala's peasant farmers into the national economy by supporting cooperatives and providing financial credits, rather than embarking on politically risky land or tax reforms.

National Centrist Union. The UCN—the major party of the political center—has proved resilient in the face of defections by key coalition partners from the right and left. Throughout the campaign, the UCN has carried out an extensive public relations effort to keep party coffers solvent and its candidate in the political forefront. Nevertheless, Carpio's generally lackluster public showing reportedly has

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Center

Center Right

Right

Extreme Right

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	ocial Democratic orty (PSD)	Christian Democratic Party (DCG)	National Centrist Union (UCN)	National Renewal Party (PNR)	National Authentic Center (CAN)	National Liberation Movement (MLN)	
	vic Democratic ont (FCD-5)		Democratic Party of National Cooperation (PDCN)	Peoples Democratic Force (FDP)	Institutional Democratic Party (PID)	Anti-Communist Democratic Front (PUA)	
			Revolutionary Party (PR)	Emerging Movement for Harmony (MEC)	National Unity Front (FUN)		
Th	e Major Presidential	Candidates	Key Dates		Vital Statistics		
Vir	nicio CEREZO Areval	o, DCG	3 Nov 85 National elections		Eligible voters - 3.9 million (estimate)		
lo	lorge CARPIO Nicolle, UCN		8 Dec 85 Presidential runoff		Registered voters - 2.8 million (estimate)		
Jor	rge SERRANO Elias, I	PDCN	14 Jan 86 President		Registered parties - 14		
Ma	ario SANDOVAL Alarc	on, MLN		ent Assembly I and new Congress	Congressional sea	s-100	
			sworn in: enters in:	new constitution	Governorships-not	applicable	
			enters in	to force.	Mayoral/local races - 329		
						•	
cost	him some support	and raised que	tions among	verbal offensives d	uring the campai	gn often have put	
seasoned political observers about his al			ability to lead a	him in the politica			
civilian government forcefully							
				Serrano's party draws a large measure of its support from evangelical Protestant groups, peasant cooperatives, and moderate members of the middle and upper classes. In our judgment, Serrano probably			
	unlike the platfor						
	omic program has						
	on specifics. Mor						
-	ise to provide son		-	is correct in predic	-	_	
-	in office the cente	erpiece of his eco		mate's well-known	-	•	
progr			he	Guatemala—will v			
	een noticeably sil		cluding how he	voters, but we also believe his chances have been hurt			
would	would pay for such an expansion.			by his party's lack of organization and the			
				questionable value of evangelical support in a largely			
The Democratic Party of National Cooperation.				Catholic country.			
L	41.'-J !A	the PDCN S		C	har Cara at t		
running third in most polls—has the potential to play				Serrano's campaign has focused largely on his			
the role of spoiler and is likely to have considerable clout in a runoff between Cerezo and Carpio.			allegations that the election is being rigged by the military. Convinced that he would win a fair contest,				
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	ne one of Guetan	nala'a mast cati	Serrano	he appears prepare	u to charge irau	i ii ne is not	
	ins one of Guaten						
charis	smatic, and contr	oversiai poiiticia	ins, whose				

The Political Spectrum:

Center Left

Left

elected. have each tried to portray themselves as "the new Serrano has promised to retire the high face" in the political arena. command, reduce military privileges, and assert not only have they failed to greater civilian control over military affairs. Such articulate a coherent platform, but also none have actions make him anathema to the armed forces and succeeded in projecting an image of statesmanship. his election would put the new civilian government at Instead, most have resorted to personal attacks that considerable risk. impugn the honesty and competence of their opponents. A recent public debate, for example, The National Liberation Movement. Historically the quickly degenerated into an emotional exchange of strongest and best organized of Guatemala's insults, with Christian Democratic candidate Cerezo traditional parties, the National Liberation making particularly harsh attacks against his rivals. Movement (MLN) has been openly described by its longtime leader, Mario Sandoval Alarcon, as the party of "organized violence." As the party of the We believe the emphasis by the major candidates on extreme right, support for the MLN traditionally has appealing to better educated urban voters has given a come from the most conservative large landowners clear advantage to those with access to or control of and business-oriented segments of the middle class. Guatemala's major media outlets. Carpio and More recently, we believe any chance the party had to Serrano, for example, have made extensive use of two win has been considerably dimmed by Sandoval's of Guatemala's major daily newspapers, El Graficorefusal to relinquish control to more moderate leaders, owned by Carpio-and La Hora-directed by a and the decision last summer of the more moderate PDCN stalwart. right to pull out of coalition. candidate of a minor party has benefited from political exposure afforded by his popular television Furthermore, although news program. Sandoval has attempted to convince voters that he has moderated his views, [Despite vindictive personal attacks, all the candidates he is having difficulty escaping his political past. The have attempted to avoid rhetoric that could incite civil MLN has been blamed by some for inciting unrest and provoke the military to delay or cancel the antigovernment riots during strikes and elections. Antigovernment riots in late August and demonstrations over busfare hikes in late August. early September, for example, led most candidates to Cerezo has accused back off from earlier criticism of the regime's Sandoval of orchestrating an assassination attempt economic policies. Most have avoided public against him in June 1985. discussions of politically sensitive civilian-military relations in the new government. Minor Parties. In our judgment, none of the minor parties contesting the election are likely to win a sizable share of the votes during the first round. We We believe the military remains committed to believe, however, that their significance will increase carrying out elections and that the current regime will during a runoff as the major contenders scramble for be able to see the elections through to completion. support. Although most minor parties already have tipped their no candidate is well placed to win the hand-at least privately-as to where they will throw required majority on the first ballot, a runoff between their support in any runoff, we expect hard bargaining the two top votegetters-now set for 8 December-is likely. We agree with most local polls-whose as they attempt to maximize their influence. findings are backed by nonpartisan political Campaign Atmospherics observers-that suggest that Cerezo and Carpio are Overall, the campaign appears to have generated the most likely candidates to face each other in the popular enthusiasm, and second round of balloting. the major candidates

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We expect the interim period between elections to be marked by increasingly intense maneuvering for support by first-round winners, while losers jockey for promises and advantages from political suitors.

Campaign rhetoric is likely to continue to focus on personal attacks, with each candidate attempting to discredit the other.

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